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Inflation Regimes and Inflation Expectations
Joseph E. Gagnon
This paper examines the formation of expectations about future inflation over long horizons.
A key issue that agents must confront is the possibility that the economic policy framework—
especially the monetary policy regime—could change at some future date. Agents are likely to
base inferences about possible future regimes on experience over many years and decades past.
This aspect of expectations formation may explain why inflation premiums in long-term bond
yields are higher in countries with a long history of high inflation. (JEL E52, E61, G12)
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decade. Indeed, Canadian inflation was lower
than U.S. inflation in 13 of the 16 years since
1991. Despite this consistent record of lower infla-
tion, the yield on 10-year government bonds in
Canada was higher than comparable yields in
the United States in both periods.1 Similarly, the
inflation rate was lower in New Zealand than in
Australia for 14 of the past 16 years. New Zealand
bond yields were slightly lower than Australian
yields in the 1990s, but by less than the difference
in inflation rates, and they have been higher than
Australian yields in the current decade, despite
continued lower inflation.
One explanation for these findings is that
long-term inflation expectations depend on a
long history of past inflation—more than just the
past 5 or 10 years. Indeed, during the 1980s, infla-
tion averaged 5.8 percent in Canada versus 4.6
percent in the United States and 10.2 percent in
“The further backward you look, the further
forward you can see.”
—Winston Churchill
A
verage inflation rates in industrial
countries have fallen substantially
since the 1980s. In several cases,
countries that experienced higher
inflation than the industrial-country average
during the 1970s and 1980s achieved lower-than-
average inflation in the 1990s. Bond yields in
industrial countries have generally fallen by more
than inflation rates, reflecting increased credibil-
ity of anti-inflationary policies. But the countries
with the lowest inflation rates in recent years
have not necessarily been those with the lowest
bond yields. In particular, countries with a long
history of higher inflation continue to have
higher bond yields.
To provide concrete examples, Table 1 shows
two bilateral comparisons: the United States
versus Canada and Australia versus New Zealand.
Average inflation was lower in Canada than in the
United States in both the 1990s and the current
1 The higher Canadian bond yields in this decade are all the more
surprising in light of the fiscal surplus in Canada and the fiscal
deficit in the United States.
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IINew Zealand versus 7.8 percent in Australia. A
similar pattern (not shown) also characterizes
the 1970s. In each case, the country with lower
recent inflation experienced higher inflation
over a long period in the past. The effect of past
inflation over a long horizon may also explain
the higher bond yields in Australia and New
Zealand versus the United States and Canada.2
More generally, there is evidence documented
by Gagnon (1996) that nominal long-term interest
rates are strongly correlated with both recent
inflation and past inflation over a long horizon.
This correlation holds both across countries and
within countries over time. One explanation for
this correlation is that long-term inflation expec-
tations are influenced by a long history of past
inflation.
This article develops a theoretical framework
to explain these empirical findings. The basic
idea is that at least since the collapse of the gold
standard in the 1930s, the policy regimes of most
central banks have periodically changed. Regime
changes may be associated with changes in the
central bank governor or political party in power,
depending on the institutional independence of
the central bank. Other factors may give rise to
regime changes: Evolving theories about economic
behavior may lead to new views on the optimal
conduct of monetary policy. Or, extreme social
or economic shocks may necessitate a persistent
shift in monetary policy. However, in general, it
is not useful to think of the regime changing with
every shock. Instead, regimes are viewed as
implicit or explicit rules governing the behavior of
monetary policy in response to ordinary shocks.
One important outcome of different monetary
regimes is different average inflation rates across
regimes. When agents consider expected inflation
over a long future horizon, they must factor-in
the possibility that the current regime will not
survive over the horizon in question. Recent infla-
tion rates may provide a good forecast of future
inflation rates if the current regime survives, but
they may not provide a good forecast if the current
regime is replaced. To factor-in the effect of a
potential new regime, agents may base their fore-
casts on their experience of past monetary regimes
over a long horizon.
For instance, in 1989 the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand adopted a central target of 1 percent
inflation, which was lower than the inflation rate
in 39 of the previous 40 years. It is likely that any
agent considering the possibility of a new infla-
tion regime in the future would expect the new
regime to have average inflation greater than 1
percent. Even if agents believed that the Reserve
Bank would achieve its target of 1 percent infla-
tion in the current regime, they would have to
factor the possibility of a change to a higher-
inflation regime into their expectations, thereby
raising expected future inflation above 1 percent.
The importance of regime changes for expecta-
Gagnon
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Table 1
Average Inflation Rates and Bond Yields
1981-90 1991-2000 2001-06
Inflation Yield Inflation Yield Inflation Yield
United States 4.6 10.3 2.8 6.4 2.7 4.5
Canada 5.8 11.6 2.0 7.4 2.3 5.1
Australia 7.8 13.6 2.2 7.8 3.1 5.6
New Zealand 10.2 14.0 1.7 7.5 2.6 6.0
SOURCE: Consumer price inflation rates and long-term government bond yields were obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics.
2 Another explanation for different nominal long-term interest rates
is that real long-term interest rates may differ across countries.
Market forces should arbitrage away such differences over time as
long as capital and goods markets are open. Moreover, as discussed
later, direct evidence on the inflation component of bond yields
supports the conclusions of this paper.tions of future inflation was borne out by subse-
quent political developments in New Zealand,
which led to an increase in the center of the infla-
tion target range from 1 percent to 1.5 percent
and then to 2 percent.
In addition to explaining long-run inflation
expectations in bond markets, a model with
regime changes can explain the peculiar time-
series properties of actual inflation over the post-
war period. For most industrial countries, it is
difficult to reject a unit root in the inflation rate.
Yet, recent studies have found some evidence of
weak mean reversion of inflation rates over long
horizons. It is well known that structural breaks
in an otherwise stationary series can induce
apparent unit roots into the series. If inflation has
undergone a small number of regime shifts in the
postwar period, it would be difficult to reject a
unit root. However, if the regime shifts themselves
were around a constant average inflation rate, one
would expect to find some evidence of mean
reversion in inflation. Moreover, within relatively
long-lasting regimes, it should be possible to reject
a unit root, which may explain the apparent sta-
tionarity of inflation over certain subsamples.
Finally, the possibility of regime shifts leads
to highly asymmetric distributions of future infla-
tion rates. The asymmetric distribution of future
inflation may explain the asymmetric distribution
of survey responses on future inflation expecta-
tions. Moreover, the asymmetric distribution of
future inflation may explain the frequently large
discrepancies between surveys of inflation expec-
tations and implied inflation expectations in bond
yields. If survey respondents report the most likely
outcome (the statistical mode) and bondholders
care about the average outcome (the statistical
mean), then the discrepancy between different
measures of inflation expectations would be
resolved.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Empirical Models of Inflation
Empirical analyses of the long-run properties
of inflation rates have often occurred in the con-
text of the real interest rate literature. See, for
example, Rose (1988) and Mishkin (1992). Using
data from the entire postwar period, one cannot
reject a unit root in inflation for most industrial
countries using standard augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests. However, for many countries, one
can reject nonstationarity of the inflation rate in
certain subsamples.
Hassler and Wolters (1995) and Baillie,
Chung, and Tieslau (1996) use the Phillips-Perron
test and the KPSS test on postwar monthly infla-
tion rates and reject both a unit root and station-
arity for several countries. To reconcile these
conflicting findings, they turn to models with
“fractional integration” and find that they are
strongly supported by the data. Fractional inte-
gration allows for slow mean reversion that does
not decay as rapidly as the asymptotically expo-
nential pattern associated with standard autore-
gressive moving-average models. This slow
mean reversion is termed “long memory.”
Other researchers have sought to explain the
apparent nonstationarity of inflation as the result
of regime shifts in the mean and variability of
the inflation rate. Chapman and Ogaki (1993),
Hostland (1995), Bai and Perron (1998), and Levin
and Piger (2002) find significant evidence of
regime shifts in inflation in several industrial
countries, including the United States. Evans
and Lewis (1995), Ricketts and Rose (1995), and
Simon (1996) estimate Markov-switching models
for inflation in the G-7 countries and Australia.
At least two regimes are statistically significant
in all countries except Germany.
Occasional shifts in the inflation regime are
more economically interpretable than fractional
integration. Moreover, if there are only a small
number of regimes that cycle back and forth, or
if the regime-generating process is stationary,
simple models of inflation will appear to have
long memory, which is consistent with the frac-
tional integration literature.
Evidence from Bond Markets
Instead of modeling the inflation process, a
more direct way to learn about long-run inflation
expectations is to examine the inflation premiums
in long-term bond markets. Fuhrer (1996) shows
that the pure expectations theory of the term
Gagnon
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breaks in the Fed reaction function, especially
the implicit inflation target. Gagnon (1996) shows
that the inflation premium in long-term interest
rates is more closely correlated with a long back-
ward average of inflation than a short backward
average, implying that there is long memory in
long-run inflation expectations and/or the infla-
tion risk premium.
Focusing directly on countries that announced
explicit inflation targets, Ammer and Freeman
(1995) and Freeman and Willis (1995) provide
evidence that announced inflation targets were
not fully credible in the first few years after adop-
tion, where credibility is defined as obtaining
long-term inflation expectations equal to the
official target for inflation. I present updated
evidence on credibility of inflation policies in a
later section of this paper.
MODELS OF INFLATION REGIMES
Complete Information
I begin with a model in which agents are fully
informed. They know when a regime change has
occurred. They know the inflation target of the
current regime. They know the probability with
which the current regime will end in the next
period. And they know the probability distribu-
tion of the inflation target across future regimes.
(I will relax some of these assumptions later.)
(1)
(2)
The inflation rate, ˀ, in each period is given
by the inflation target, Π, effective in the previous
period plus a random error, ʵ. This lag reflects
the conventional monetary transmission lag of
roughly one year. The word “target” is used
loosely to mean the expected inflation rate within
a given regime. It does not necessarily imply that
the central bank is officially or unofficially aiming
for this inflation rate, only that this inflation rate
is the expected average outcome of its policies.
More generally, one might expect the variability
ΠΠ tt t t t =− ( ) + − 1 1 ʸʸ η
ˀε tt t =+ − Π 1
and persistence of the temporary shock, ʵ, to be
different across regimes. However, such an empiri-
cally realistic extension would add complexity
to the model without altering the basic theoretical
conclusion.
A regime shift (ʸ = 1) occurs with probability
q. With probability 1 – q there is no regime shift
(ʸ = 0). The probability of a regime shift in each
period determines the average length of regimes.
The expected length of a regime is 1/q periods.
An empirically reasonable range for inflation
regimes is between 2 and 20 years, implying a
value of q between 0.05 and 0.5. New inflation
targets, ʷ, are drawn from a normal distribution
with mean m and standard deviation ʺ.
This specification of the regime-shifting
mechanism is silent on the forces that end existing
regimes and give rise to new regimes. One inter-
pretation is that different central bank governors
have different objectives with regard to the level
and variability of inflation and other economic
variables. These differences are not fully observ-
able prior to the appointment of a new governor.
The term of each governor is random and depends
on both personal factors and the struggle of parti-
san politics. Alternatively, inflation regimes may
be seen as the outcome of broader social and politi-
cal forces that are manifested in opinion polls,
public debates, and election results. Still another
possibility is that regime shifts are triggered by
certain large and persistent shocks, such as energy
supply shocks.
One important feature of the models devel-
oped in this paper is that the regime-generating
process is stationary. In the broad global and
historical context, this assumption is reasonable,
because inflation rates tend to be bounded
between a small negative and a large positive
number. Hyperinflations are at most sporadic
and not persistent, while hyperdeflations have
never happened. However, within these bounds
it is conceivable that the regime-generating
process has drifted over time. Such a drift may
be the result of demographic or technological
forces that operate on a time scale much larger
than that of monetary policy regimes. Or one may
view the switch to fiat money standards this past
century as the beginning of a new era in which
Gagnon
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inflation preferences by trial and error. In such a
world, one would expect the mean of inflation
regimes to drift as central bank learning proceeds.
In either case, inflation regimes would appear
stationary over a sufficiently long time span, but
may appear nonstationary in certain finite sam-
ples.
I begin this analysis by considering the forma-
tion of inflationary expectations in this model.
Expected inflation over the next period is simply
given by the current inflation target as shown in
equation (3). Expected inflation in subsequent
periods is a weighted average of the current infla-
tion target and the expected value of future infla-
tion targets, as shown by equations (4) and (5).
The farther ahead one looks, the more likely there
will be at least one regime shift and the greater the





One important property of this model is that
the probability density of future inflation is not
symmetric if there is a possibility that a regime
change may affect the inflation rate in the period
in question. The probability density of inflation
one period ahead is symmetric because any
regime shift that may occur next period will not
affect inflation until the following period. For one-
period-ahead inflation, the probability density is
simply the normal density with mean equal to
the current inflation target and variance equal to
that of the temporary shock (equation (6)). The
notation fʵ￿x￿ refers to the probability density of
the variable ʵ evaluated at the value x. For exam-
ple, if ˃ = 1, fʵ￿0￿ = 0.4 because ʵ has a standard
normal distribution and the standard normal
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If we look two periods ahead, the probability
density of inflation takes on a two-part form. The
first term in equation (7) states that if the current
regime survives next period (with probability
1 – q), the probability density of inflation two
periods ahead is the same as for one period ahead.
The second term in equation (7) states that if the
current regime is replaced next period (with prob-
ability q), the probability density of inflation in
subsequent periods is a convolution of two den-
sities. The first density under the integral is the
density of inflation targets across regimes, and
the second density is the density of inflation rates
within a regime.
If we look ahead 1 + i periods, the probability
of remaining in the current regime declines to
(1 – q)
i and the probability of moving to a new
regime increases accordingly. It is possible that
there may be one or more regime shifts over this
horizon, but the probability density of future
inflation is independent of the number of regime
shifts that may occur.3
I now consider an example to illustrate the
properties of this model. The parameters are
adapted from the three-state Markov process
estimates of Ricketts and Rose (1995; RR) for
Canada over the period 1954-93. RR assume that
inflation cycles among three different regimes,
with mean inflation rates of 1.5, 4.5, and 9 per-
cent.4 Translating these estimates into the model
fxf x
t t ˀ ε + ( ) =− ( )
1 Π
fx q f x qf x fd
t t ˀε η ε εε ε
+ ( ) =− ( ) − ( )+− ( ) ( )
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3 This property would not hold true if there were dependence
across regimes.
4 RR allow different serial correlations and variances of inflation in
different regimes. In the high-inflation regime they impose a unit
root on the inflation rate, which is not rejected by the data. With a
unit root the population mean is undefined, but the sample mean
is 9 percent.of this section implies a mean inflation rate across
regimes of 5 percent (ﾵ = 5) with a standard devi-
ation of 3 percent (ʺ = 3). (The average inflation
rate over this sample is also 5 percent.) The prob-
ability of entering a new regime is 30 percent per
year (q = 0.3).5 At the end of their sample, Canada
was in the low-inflation regime (Π = 1.5). The
standard deviation of inflation in the low-inflation
regime is 1 percent, and this estimate is adopted
for every regime in the model (˃ = 1).
Figure 1 displays the probability densities of
inflation under the current regime and under the
assumption of a regime shift without any informa-
tion on the inflation target in the new regime.
Figure 2 displays the probability densities for
inflation at different periods in the future. These
densities are weighted averages of the two densi-
ties in Figure 1, with the weight on the regime-
shift density increasing with the distance into
the future. Clearly, the weighting of these two
densities—each of which is symmetric—leads to
a highly asymmetric density for future inflation
over certain horizons.
Table 2 displays the mean, median, and mode
of inflation from 1 to 10 periods ahead under
Model 1. The asymmetry, as measured by the dif-
ference between the mean and the median, grows
quickly and peaks in period t + 3 before declining
slowly over longer horizons. In period t + 10 the
density is quite close to the future regime density
in Figure 1, which is symmetric. The density
becomes bimodal in periods t + 4 through t + 9,
with the second peak overtaking the first peak in
period t + 8. Over the entire 10-year period, the
average of the mean inflation rates is 3.9 percent,
the average of the medians is 3.5 percent, and the
average of the modes is 2.7 percent.
Learning about the Current Regime
Of the four informational assumptions
described at the beginning of the previous sub-
5 RR allow different probabilities of a regime shift, depending on
the regime. For Canada, the probability of exiting a regime is close
to 0.3 for each of the three regimes.
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Model 1section, the most realistic are that agents know
when there has been a regime change and that
they know the probability of a regime change in
any given period. Regime changes are likely to
be associated with observable events such as a
change in the party or individual in control of
the central bank, an announcement by the central
bank indicating that a new policy has been
adopted, or a major economic or social shock
such as a war. The probability of a regime change
is given by the institutional structure of govern-
ment and the randomness of individual career
decisions and lifespans. It does not seem unrea-
sonable to assume that agents understand this
process well, or at least that their beliefs about it
are not changing over time.
The first assumption that I relax is the assump-
tion that agents know any new target inflation
rate immediately. Instead, I assume that agents
learn about the current regime by observing the
inflation rates that occur. During the period in
which a regime shift occurs, the best any agent
can do is to expect future inflation to be equal to
the mean across regimes, ﾵ. (See equation (9).)
The probability density is given by the convolu-
tion of the target density and the density of devi-
ations from target, shown in equation (10).
(9)
(10)
In the following period, an inflation rate is
observed. Assuming that there is no regime
change, the optimal learning procedure is to use
Bayes’s rule to update the probability density of
future inflation under the assumption that the
current regime continues. The prior density is
given by equation (10). Equation (12) displays
Bayes’s rule, which uses the prior density com-
bined with observed information on inflation in
the current regime to determine the conditional
probability density of future inflation under the
assumption that the current regime survives.
Because inflation one period ahead is not affected
by any future regime change, its expected value
fx f xf d i t ti , ,, ˀη ε εε ε




Ei tt i ˀµ + == ￿ 1, , … `
is given by the standard formula for the expecta-
tion of a continuously distributed random vari-
able displayed in equation (11) using the density
defined by equation (12).
(11)
(12)
Once the current regime ends, the distribution
of future inflation reverts to its prior distribution
(equation (10)). Thus, the probability density of
inflation more than one period ahead takes the
compound form presented in equation (14). In all
periods beyond t + 2, the probability density of
inflation is equal to the probability of no regime
change times the density for period t + 2 plus the
probability of a regime change times the prior
density of inflation under an unknown regime.
The expected value of inflation in periods beyond
t + 2 (equation (13)) takes a compound form par-
allel to equation (14). Note that the expected value
of inflation under the prior density is ﾵ, the aver-
age inflation target across regimes.
fx





+ ( ) =
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Table 2
Asymmetric Distribution of Future Inflation
Rates: Model 1
Πt = 1.5, ˃ = 1, ﾵ = 5, ʺ = 3, q = 0.3
Date Mean Median Mode
t+1 1.5 1.5 1.5
t+2 2.5 1.9 1.5
t+3 3.3 2.4 1.6
t+4 3.8 3.1 1.6
t+5 4.2 3.6 1.7
t+6 4.4 4.1 1.8
t+7 4.6 4.5 2.0
t+8 4.7 4.6 5.0
t+9 4.8 4.7 5.0
t+10 4.9 4.8 5.0
Average 3.9 3.5 2.7(13)
(14)
After observing inflation in period t + 2, the
conditional density of inflation in period t + 3
is given by Bayes’s rule using the prior density
(equation (10)) and two pieces of information,
ˀt+1 and ˀt+2. (This density is not shown.) As
more periods of inflation are observed without a
regime shift, the influence of the prior density
diminishes and the conditional density of infla-
tion approaches that of the case in which the
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I now consider an example to illustrate the
properties of this model. As in the previous sec-
tion, suppose that the mean inflation target across
regimes is 5 percent, with a standard deviation
of 3 percent, and that the probability of a new
regime is 0.3 per period. Suppose that within a
regime, the standard deviation of inflation around
its target is 1 percent and the current inflation
target is 1.5 percent. If a regime shift occurs in
the current period, the conditional density of
future inflation in every period is given simply
by the density under the assumption of a future
regime shift, as shown in Figure 1.
If a regime shift occurred last period and the
regime survives in the current period, the distri-
bution of next period’s inflation depends on the
current observation of inflation. If we assume
that current inflation is 1.5 (the current inflation
target), Figure 3 displays the probability density
of inflation next period. For comparison, the den-
sity assuming complete knowledge of the current
Gagnon
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Model 2regime is also plotted. Note that the density with
incomplete knowledge is more diffuse than that
assuming complete knowledge. Figure 4 displays
the probability densities for inflation at various
periods in the future. These densities are weighted
averages of the density in Figure 3 and the density
assuming an unknown regime shift (shown in
Figure 1). Once again, the weighting of these two
densities—each of which is symmetric—leads to
an asymmetric density for future inflation.
Table 3, which pertains to Model 2, displays
the mean, median, and mode of inflation from 1
to 10 periods ahead, conditional on observing
inflation in period t + 1 after a regime shift in
period t. The growing asymmetry is readily appar-
ent, but not as extreme as in the case of complete
knowledge of the current regime.
Learning about Future Regimes
The other assumption that I relax is the
assumption that agents know the distribution of
target inflation rates across future regimes. To
simplify the analysis, I return to the assumption
that agents know the current and past inflation
targets.
In this model, agents must estimate the mean
and standard deviation of inflation targets across
regimes using data on past regimes. Each time a
new regime occurs, agents update their estimates
of the mean and standard deviation. Expected
inflation in the next period is simply the current
inflation target, shown in equation (15). Expected
inflation more than one period ahead is a weighted
average of the current inflation target and the
average of current and past inflation targets. (See
equation (16).) Because inflation regimes typically
last for more than one period, the second term in
equation (16) is an average computed using the
first year of each regime, denoted by the set {RN},
which contains N elements, where N is the num-
ber of regimes. By the law of large numbers, when
N is large, the right-hand side of equation (16)
approaches equality with the right-hand sides of
equations (2) and (3). In other words, when there
have been many regimes in the past, agents can




The probability density of inflation one
period ahead is given by equation (17), which is
identical to equation (6). The probability densities
of inflation more than one period ahead are given
by equation (18), under the assumption of a dif-
fuse prior distribution on the mean and standard
deviation of inflation targets across regimes.
(17)
(18)
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Table 3
Asymmetric Distribution of Future Inflation
Rates: Model 2
Πt = 1.5, ˃ = 1, ﾵ = 5, ʺ = 3, q = 0.3
Date Mean Median Mode
t+2 1.8 1.8 1.8
t+3 2.8 2.3 1.9
t+4 3.5 2.8 2.0
t+5 3.9 3.3 2.2
t+6 4.2 3.8 2.4
t+7 4.5 4.2 2.7
t+8 4.6 4.4 3.6
t+9 4.7 4.6 4.6
t+10 4.8 4.7 4.8
t+11 4.9 4.8 4.9
Average 4.0 3.7 3.1As the number of past regimes increases,
this density approaches those of equations (7) and
(8) and we return to the case of complete knowl-
edge about the distribution of future inflation
targets.
To illustrate the properties of this model, I
need to specify values of current and past inflation
targets. To continue with the flavor of past exam-
ples, I choose past inflation targets of 4.5 percent
and 9 percent and a current inflation target of 1.5
percent. The average of these targets is 5 percent
and the standard deviation is 3 percent. Thus,
these outcomes are consistent with the earlier
assumption of ﾵ = 5 and ʺ = 3. Figure 5 displays
the density of future inflation under the assump-
tion that there is a regime shift—that is, the ratio
of the triple integral to the double integral in equa-
tion (18). For comparison, Figure 5 also displays
the density of future inflation after a regime shift
under the assumption of complete knowledge of
the distribution of inflation targets, which was
originally displayed in Figure 1. It is not surpris-
ing that the density without knowledge is more
diffuse than the density with knowledge. Both
densities are symmetric around the same mean,
however, as a result of the choice of observed
inflation targets with the same mean as the true
distribution.
Figure 6 displays the densities of inflation in
three specific future periods. Once again, the
densities are asymmetric whenever there is a
positive probability that a regime shift may affect
inflation in the period in question. Table 4, which
pertains to Model 3, displays the mean, median,
and mode of inflation in various future periods
under the assumption that agents do not know
the parameters of the distribution of future infla-
tion targets and must infer them from observed
inflation targets. The means and medians are
identical to those displayed in Table 1 because the
average of current and past inflation is assumed
to be equal to the true mean of inflation targets
across regimes. The only difference between
Model 3 and Model 1 is that the density of infla-
Gagnon
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Model 3tion after a regime change is much more diffuse.
This diffuseness affects the mode of future infla-
tion because the secondary peak at 5 percent infla-
tion is much lower than in Model 1. This
diffuseness has no effect on the mean or median of
future inflation.
Finally, I consider the effect of a new regime
on the mean of future inflation in the case of
learning about the distribution of inflation targets.
Suppose that a new regime occurs in the example
above with an inflation target of 1.5 percent. In
other words, suppose that a new central bank
governor chose to continue the previous inflation
target of 1.5 percent. The effect of this new regime
depends on the number of previously observed
regimes. If there were only three previous regimes,
the average of current and past inflation targets
drops from 5 percent to 4.1 percent. If there were
ten previous regimes, which is the number of
regimes estimated for Canada by RR, the average
of current and past regimes declines by much less,
from 5 percent to 4.7 percent. In other words, the
effect of a given inflation regime on agents’ expec-
tations for future regimes is smaller when agents
have experienced more changes in regimes in the
past. Of course, it is possible that agents could
draw inferences from regime changes that occurred
before they were born—which might imply a
very large number of past regimes—but in reality
it is likely that trends in political systems and in
financial technology may cause agents to heavily
discount the relevance of regimes in the distant
past.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
Estimation and testing of the models in the
previous section pose a serious econometric
challenge that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, I show that artificial data generated by
the basic model of this paper behave in a manner
similar to observed inflation and that this model
may explain certain puzzling properties of the
observed data. In addition, I show that the model
developed here may be able to explain puzzling
features of the evidence on long-run inflation
expectations.
Despite the fact that this model does not
incorporate any serial correlation of inflation
within a regime, nor any serial correlation across
regimes, it is capable of explaining much of the
observed serial correlation of inflation. Over the
sample period examined by RR, 1954-93, the
Canadian CPI inflation rate has an estimated
dominant autoregressive root of about 0.85, and
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests cannot
reject a unit root at any significance level. Monte
Carlo data generated by Model 1 with the param-
eters in Table 1 for the same number of observa-
tions yield a median dominant autoregressive root
of about 0.5; and ADF tests reject a unit root at
the 5 percent level only about 45 percent of the
time. If the model is extended to include an
autoregressive lag on inflation of 0.7 (the mean
of the within-regime autoregressive parameters
estimated by RR) and new Monte Carlo data are
generated, the median dominant root increases
to 0.82 and the power of the 5 percent ADF test
drops to 15 percent. For comparison, data gener-
ated by a simple autoregression with no regime
shifts and a lag coefficient of 0.7 yield a median
estimated dominant root of 0.66 and the power
of the 5 percent ADF test is 40 percent.
In addition to explaining the near unit-root
behavior of inflation over long horizons, a model
Gagnon
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE, PART 2 2008 239
Table 4
Asymmetric Distribution of Future Inflation
Rates: Model 3
ΠR = {4.5, 9, 1.5}, Πt = 1.5, ˃ = 1, q = 0.3
Date Mean Median Mode
t+1 1.5 1.5 1.5
t+2 2.5 1.9 1.5
t+3 3.3 2.4 1.5
t+4 3.8 3.1 1.6
t+5 4.2 3.6 1.7
t+6 4.4 4.1 1.7
t+7 4.6 4.4 1.7
t+8 4.7 4.6 1.8
t+9 4.8 4.7 1.9
t+10 4.9 4.8 2.0
Average 3.9 3.5 1.6with regime shifts can also explain the apparent
stationarity of inflation over certain shorter hori-
zons. Simply put, inflation is stationary within
regimes; therefore, one ought to be able to reject
nonstationarity in a regime that is sufficiently
long-lasting. For example, ADF tests on quarterly
U.S. inflation reject a unit root between 1954 and
1966 and also between 1984 and 1996. RR find
that regimes of this length are plausible for the
United States; using U.S. data, they estimate a
probability of only 10 percent per year of a regime
shift (q = 0.10). Levin and Piger (2002) show that
there is strong evidence of shifts in average infla-
tion in many industrial countries and that allow-
ing for such breaks leads to estimates of low
persistence in inflation in most countries.
The asymmetric distribution of future infla-
tion in these models of regime shifts may explain
the asymmetric distribution of survey responses
on future inflation expectations. Carlson (1975)
and Lahiri and Teigland (1987) present evidence
that the distribution of 1-year-ahead inflation
expectations across survey respondents is usually
asymmetrically distributed. Moreover, the direc-
tion of the skewness is identical to that predicted
by a regime-shift model for the true distribution
of future inflation.6 When inflation is higher than
its historical average, expectations are skewed
negatively. When inflation is lower than its his-
torical average, expectations are skewed positively.
A more direct measure of the asymmetry of
the distribution for future inflation is captured
by the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which
asks forecasters to provide a probability density
for next year’s inflation rate in the United States.7
Based on these densities, one can calculate the
mean, median, and mode of future inflation for
each forecaster.8 Between 1992:Q1 and 2008:Q1,
the average of the forecast means was 2.50 per-
cent; the average of the forecast medians was 2.45,
and the average of the forecast modes was 2.43.9
The differences between the average mean,
median, and mode are not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, they do follow the qualitative pat-
tern one would expect if recent inflation is below
its long-run average and agents are factoring in at
least a small probability of a change in monetary
policy regime. Moreover, this survey does not ask
for the probability density of inflation beyond
the next year. As we have seen, the impact of
potential future regime changes on the probability
distribution of inflation is greater for longer-term
forecasts.
Finally, the asymmetric distribution of future
inflation may explain the tendency for inflation
compensation in bond yields to be larger than
both the official inflation targets of central banks
and surveys of long-run expected inflation from
professional forecasters. The first column of
Table 5 lists the inflation target or the center of
the target range for countries that have announced
a numeric goal for inflation. The second column
lists average inflation expectations over the next
10 years from the October 8, 2007, Consensus
Forecasts survey.10 The third column lists infla-
tion compensation implied by the difference
between 10-year nominal and inflation-indexed
bond yields as of the same date.11 In every case
but New Zealand, the survey response for long-
run inflation is within 0.1 percent of the
announced target. This result may reflect a rela-
tively low perceived probability of a regime
shift, leading to a forecast mode equal to the tar-
6 I am unaware of any research on how the distribution of a variable
affects the distribution across individual forecasts of that variable.
Nevertheless, these results are suggestive.
7 The Survey is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia; www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/spf/. Forecasters
are asked to assign probabilities of inflation occurring in each of
10 buckets. The bucket widths are 1 percentage point, except for
the bottom and top buckets, which are open-ended. I assigned a
mid-point for the open-ended buckets equal to 1 percentage point
away from the mid-point of the adjacent bucket. The probabilities
attached to the open-ended buckets were very low. The Bank of
England has asked a similar question in its Survey of External
Forecasters since 1996, but its survey has fewer and more frequently
changing density buckets.
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8 The mean is calculated as the probability of each bucket times the
midpoint of that bucket summed over all buckets. The median is
calculated by interpolating between the midpoints of the two
buckets that have cumulative density on either side of 0.50. The
mode is calculated as the average of the midpoints of the three
buckets with highest probability weighted by their respective
probabilities.
9 Similar results were obtained for earlier years, but there were fewer
buckets and the ranges changed over time, making the estimates
much less precise.
10 See www.consensusforecasts.com.
11 Bond data were obtained from Bloomberg.get in the current regime. Interestingly, the sole
exception, New Zealand, is also the only one of
these countries to have experienced an
announced change in the inflation target since
an inflation goal was first publicly adopted. In
every case but Japan, the inflation compensation
in bond yields is greater than the policy target
and, by extension, inflation compensation in
bond yields is greater than inflation expectations
in surveys.12 If survey respondents report the
modal outcome and bondholders care about the
average outcome, then the discrepancy between




The basic point of this paper is a stark one:
Monetary regimes with inflation targets that are
quite different from the average inflation rate
across previous regimes may never be seen as
fully credible over the long term by financial
markets. Here I define credibility to be equality
between the announced inflation target and the
mean of the distribution of future inflation. This
lack of credibility is not necessarily due to slow
learning by private agents or to a lack of resolve
on the part of the central bank. Even when agents
understand and believe in the central bank’s target
inflation rate, they must attach some probability
to a change in the regime. For example, the central
bank governor may die or resign or the govern-
ment may change the institutional framework of
monetary policy. There is no way to guarantee
that these things will not happen.
The key to credibility over the long term is
the expected value of inflation under the next
regime. This paper considers two approaches to
modeling expectations of inflation under the next
regime. In the first approach, it is assumed that
agents know the constant mean inflation rate
across regimes. If the current regime’s inflation
target is equal to this long-run inflation mean, then
policy is credible in the long run. If the current
regime’s inflation target is far from the long-run
inflation mean, then policy is not credible and
policy will never become fully credible no matter
how long the current regime lasts or how often
similar regimes arise. In the second approach,
agents update their expectations about inflation
in the next regime based on inflation in the cur-
rent and previous regimes. Under this approach,
a sequence of low (or high) inflation regimes
would change agents’ expectations of inflation
Gagnon
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12 In the United Kingdom, inflation compensation in indexed bonds
is tied to the retail price index. Retail price inflation has averaged
about 0.5 percent higher than consumer price inflation, but, even
after adjusting for this difference, inflation compensation in bond
yields exceeds inflation expectations from surveys.
13 The professional forecasters surveyed in Consensus Forecasts
presumably are judged by clients on the accuracy of their forecasts.
I thank Jeff Dominitz for pointing out that forecasters should report
the mean of future inflation if the penalty for forecast errors is
proportional to the squared error. They should report something
between the mean and the mode if the penalty is proportional to
the absolute error. They should report the mode if the penalty is
constant for all errors greater than a given magnitude and zero
otherwise. In practice, forecasters communicate more to their
clients than a simple point forecast. It is common to talk of the
forecast being the most likely scenario with unequal upside and
downside risks, which would imply a forecast that is closer to the
mode than the mean. Boero, Smith, and Wallis (forthcoming) show
that point forecasts of inflation in the United Kingdom since 1996
typically lie below the mean of the inflation densities supplied by
the same forecasters.
14 Two other factors to consider are inflation risk premiums and liq-
uidity premiums. Aversion to inflation risk may account for some
of the inflation compensation in nominal bond yields. But the
lower liquidity of indexed bonds is an offsetting factor because it
tends to push up yields on indexed bonds relative to yields on
nominal bonds.
Table 5
10-Year Inflation Expectations (October 2007)
Policy Survey Bond
Australia 2.5 2.6 3.6
Canada* 2.0 2.0 2.4
Euro Area† 1.8 1.9 2.3
Japan 1.0 1.0 0.4
New Zealand 2.0 2.5 2.5
Sweden 2.0 1.9 2.5
U.K.‡ 2.0 2.0 3.2
U.S. N/A 2.2 2.4
NOTE: *For Canada, bond measure is for 14-year maturity.
†For the Euro Area, policy goal is inflation “close to but below
2 percent.” ‡For the U.K., policy and survey refer to consumer
prices whereas bonds are indexed to retail prices.in the next regime. However, as demonstrated in
a simple example, significant changes in long-run
inflation expectations may still require a great
deal of time.
One plausible extension of these models is
to consider learning on the part of the central
bank. For example, one may argue that the high
inflation of the 1970s was a mistake, that central
banks have learned their lessons, and that the
public understands that this episode will not
recur. Under this hypothesis, agents ought to
place more weight on recent inflation rates when
forming expectations about inflation in the next
regime; in this case, long-run credibility would
be easier to obtain than in the basic models.
Nevertheless, as long as agents place some posi-
tive weight on past inflation targets in forming
expectations about future inflation targets, the
credibility problem will remain.
Another extension of the model would be to
consider variation over time in the probability of
a regime shift. One way to increase the long-run
credibility of the current inflation target is to take
steps to reduce the probability of a regime shift.
Recent attempts in many countries to increase
the independence of the central bank may be
interpreted as reducing the probability of a regime
shift and thus strengthening credibility. Never-
theless, it is not possible to guarantee that any
regime will last forever.
Although the hypothesis of central bank learn-
ing seems plausible and many central banks have
achieved greater independence in recent years,
I would like to conclude the paper by noting sev-
eral caveats. First, the recent recurrence of infla-
tion in some countries that have a long history
of inflation (such as Argentina and Venezuela)
argues for caution about the idea that a bad expe-
rience with inflation inoculates a country against
future inflation. At the very least, one should
keep in mind that lessons learned may become
lessons forgotten. Second, even if central banks
have learned their lessons well and permanently,
the public may be skeptical and the time needed
to convince the public may be measured in
decades rather than years. Third, even if one does
discount the possibility of a return to double-
digit inflation, it is harder to justify ignoring the
possibility of a return to moderate inflation rates
of around 5 percent or so. In light of the fact that
no one is recommending a regime with negative
inflation rates, an inflation target that is very close
to zero can never be credible in the long run, as
long as there is some possibility of a return to
positive inflation.
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